Florida Law Review
Volume 45

Issue 2

Article 2

March 1993

The Need for Fair Play: Repealing the Federal Baseball Antitrust
Exemption
Connie Mack
Richard M. Blau

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Connie Mack and Richard M. Blau, The Need for Fair Play: Repealing the Federal Baseball Antitrust
Exemption, 45 Fla. L. Rev. 201 (1993).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol45/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Mack and Blau: The Need for Fair Play: Repealing the Federal Baseball Antitrust

THE NEED FOR FAIR PLAY: REPEALING THE FEDERAL
BASEBALL ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
Hon. Connie Mack*
RichardM. Blau, Esq.**

I.

INTRODUCTION ...............................

201

II.

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS ......................

210

m.

THE SCOPE OF BASEBALL'S EXEMPION .............

212

IV.

THE IMPACT OF STARE DECISIS ...................

215

V.

THE BENEFITS OF UNIFORM ANTITRUST
REGULATION ................................

216

BASEBALL'S TROUBLED TIMES ...................

218

VI.
VII.

CONCLUSION ................................ 220

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 9, 1992, the owners of Major League Baseball (MLB)
met in Scottsdale, Arizona to decide whether to approve relocation of the
San Francisco Giants baseball franchise to the Tampa Bay area.' Three
months earlier, the Giants' owner, Bob Lurie, had announced an exclusive
agreement to sell the Giants to a group of Florida investors for $115 mil-

lion.2 Mr. Lurie's decision to sell the Giants followed four unsuccessful
attempts between 1987 and 1992 to get northern California communities to
build a replacement stadium for San Francisco's ailing and unpopular
* The Honorable Connie Mack is the junior United States Senator representing the State of
Florida.
** Mr. Blau is a litigation partner in the law firm of Holland & Knight, where he specializes in
complex commercial litigation and trade regulation.
1. Hubert Mizell, Only a Miracle Can Save Tampa Bay, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 10,

1992, at IC.
2. Murray Chass, Baseball's Giants Reach Agreement to Move to Florida,N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8,

1992, § 1, at I.
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Candlestick Park.' Commissioner of Baseball Fay Vincent finally authorized Mr. Lurie to look for a new home for the Giants4 after a referendum
to build a new stadium in San Jose was defeated in June 1992. 5
The cities of the Tampa Bay area immediately were considered the
front-runners among those likely to bid for the Giants.6 For several years,
public and private interests from Tampa Bay had sought to attract a professional baseball franchise to play its regular season home games in the
Florida Suncoast Dome, St. Petersburg's $138 million stadium built in
1988.' After failing in its efforts to attract the Chicago White Sox' and
the Seattle Mariners,9 as well as losing a 1991 bid for an expansion team
franchise," acquisition of the San Francisco Giants appeared to be the
answer to Tampa Bay's prayers for professional baseball.
Under normal market conditions, the transaction might have been a
smooth one, even though no baseball team had moved in the previous
twenty years." Both the buyer and the seller were not only willing, but
enthusiastic. 2 The purchase price was profitable for Mr. Lurie 3 and
deemed to be a good investment by the Tampa Bay investors.' 4 The
transaction appeared to meet MLB's preliminary sale guidelines: Mr. Lurie

3. Id.; see also Ken Hoover, Giants Deal Could Be Killed by Commissioner, Team Owners, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 8, 1992, at A16 (describing the Giants' recurring problems in securing a suitable stadium).
4. Marc Topkin et al., Giants Told They Can Look at Move, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 12,
1992, at IA.
5. Glenn Dickey, San Jose Says No to Giants, S.F. CHRON., June 4, 1992, at CI.
6. William Carlsen, San Jose's Rejection of Giants Stirs Baseball-HungryCities, S.F. CHRON.,
June 4, 1992, at A17.
7. Id. In August 1993, the name of the Florida Suncoast Dome was officially changed to the
"Thunderdome." Monica Davey, Suncoast Dome Dead, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 6, 1993, at lB.
8. David Olinger et al., Illinois Says Yes to Sox-Legislative Acts at Last Minute to Head Off
Move, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 1, 1988, at IA.
9. Marc Topkin, Losing Streak Gets Longer: MarinersStay in Seattle, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
June 10, 1992, at IA. A Tampa Bay group of investors, headed by Frank Morsani, had also unsuccessfully pursued relocation of the Minnesota Twins in 1984, the Oakland Athletics in 1985, and the Texas
Rangers in 1988. Thomas C. Tobin et al., Morsani Reduces His Role in Bay Area Baseball Group, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 13, 1990, at IC.
10. Marc Topkin et al., Say It Ain't So-Baseball Skips Over Tampa Bay, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, June 11, 1991, at IA.
11. See Ross Newhan, S.F. Giants Owner Agrees to Sell to Tampa Bay Group, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
8, 1992, at Al.
12. Larry Tye, A Giant Step Up? Sports-Crazed Tampa-St. Pete Area Thinks Its Ready to Play
Ball with the Big Boys, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 16, 1992, at 49.
13. Hal Bodley, Read Owners' Lips: No Team Moves, USA TODAY, Nov. 11, 1992, at 3C. available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Majpap file.
14. See Bruce Lowitt, S.F. Mayor Looks to Top Landlord, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 13,
1992, at 2A (citing the example of the Giants, which were purchased by Mr. Lurie for $8 million in
1976, compared to the $115 million offered for the team by the Tampa Bay group in 1992).
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had been encouraged by the Commissioner to shop his team, t" and the
Tampa Bay investors had been formally declared "qualified" by a MLB
executive committee."
MLB owners initially gave strong support for the proposed Tampa
Bay transaction. 7 Only three days before MLB's ownership meetings in
Scottsdale, some newspapers reported the transaction would be ap-

proved. 8 However, on November 10, 1992, following two days of
closed-door meetings, MLB executives emerged to report that National

League owners had voted 9-4 to reject the Tampa Bay group's purchase of
the Giants.

9

The "done deal" had come undone, and Tampa Bay once

again did not have a professional baseball team.'
The death of Tampa Bay's bid to buy the Giants has raised many
questions. How had this unexpected turn of events come to pass? MLB's
rejection of the Lurie-Tampa Bay deal was improbable in light of the
Tampa Bay group's strong financial position and Mr. Lurie's popularity
among MLB owners. 2' Nor was the rejection readily explained. Assessing
how the decision was reached has proven especially difficult for those

outside the MLB's meeting rooms because of behind-the-scenes maneuvering and different factors motivating individual owners.' Perhaps most
confusing of all is the basis by which MLB purported to act: What was
the owners' legal authority to step in and kill such a well-structured and

mutually beneficial free market transaction?
15. Topkin et al., supra note 4, at IA.
16. Marc Sandalow et al., Favorable Signs for S.F. on Eve of Giants Vote: Local Investors Pass
Key Test, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 10, 1992, at Al. Qualification of a potential ownership group is one of
the biggest obstacles in obtaining MLB approval for the sale of a franchise team. See Stephen
Nohlgren et al., A Giant Leap: What Might Still Go Wrong?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 8, 1992, at
IA (noting that a weaker ownership group was a principal reason why Tampa Bay lost out to Denver
and Miami in MLB's expansion in 1991).
17. See Mark Maske, Proposed Move to Florida Seems to Have Found a Place in the Sun,
WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1992, at D7.
18. See Bill Madden, Owners to Approve Giants Move?, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 10, 1992, at E3
(noting concern among some owners that the $100 million offer to keep the Giants in San Francisco
was "full of holes").
19. Marc Sandalow et al., Giants to Stay, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 11, 1992, at Al.
20. See Mark Woods, Seven Strikes Against Tampa Bay, USA TODAY, Nov. 11, 1992, at 2C,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Majpap file (describing Tampa Bay's numerous unsuccessful efforts to obtain a professional baseball team); supranotes 6-10 and accompanying text.
21. Nohlgren et al., supra note 16, at IA. Mr. Lurie was so highly regarded by the other owners
that one San Francisco businessman, who hoped to buy the Giants before the transaction was announced, anticipated the owners would unanimously approve the sale. Id.
22. See Sandalow et al., supra note 19, at Al.
23. See Murray Chass, Sports of the Times: Baseball's Strange Bedfellows, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
1992, at B9. The owners' motivations, which will never be fully known, are reportedly as varied and
diverse as the owners themselves. See Rod Beaton, Lurie Has Good Lineup ofAL Votes, USA TODAY,
Aug. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Majpap file (listing the motivations and anticipated
votes of several MLB owners); Chass, supra, at B9.
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Federal law prohibits individuals or groups from engaging in activities
that operate as a restraint on trade.24 Nevertheless, MLB used an arcane
and relatively little-known exemption from federal antitrust laws to frustrate Mr. Lurie and effectively unwrite his exclusive contract with the
Tampa Bay investors.' The exemption stems from an inconspicuous case
decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1922, at a time when
baseball games were "exhibitions" and baseball players usually earned less
than $10,000 a season.26 Commonly known as the FederalBaseball case,
the Supreme Court decision held that professional baseball was not subject
to federal antitrust laws because presentation of baseball exhibitions was
not interstate "commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act and
other antitrust laws.27 Since 1922, MLB has cited the Federal Baseball
decision time and again to take actions that would have been declared
unlawful under other circumstances.
Other sports that have attempted to claim a similar antitrust exemption, such as professional football and basketball leagues, have been

24. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(Supp. III 1991)). Specifically, federal law provides that
[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony ....
15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 111 1991).
25. Karl Vick, Senators Vow Fight Over Antitrust Exemption, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 11,
1992, at 11A.
26. See Dave Perkins, Ball Salaries Would Even Impress Ruth, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 6, 1991, at
F4. Bibb Falk, who replaced "Shoeless" Joe Jackson in the Chicago White Sox lineup after the "Black
Sox" scandal, had a 1920 salary of $2,500 (plus a $1,000 signing bonus). Obituary of Bibb A. Falk,
SPORTING NEWS, June 19, 1989, at 73. Walter Johnson, who won 36 games for the Senators in 1913
and was the most prolific pitcher of his time, made $12,000 a year. Shirley Povich, Baseball Salaries
Take Odd Hops, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1987, at BI. Ty Cobb, one of professional baseball's all-time
legends, earned $85,000 in 1927, tens of thousands of dollars more than the next highest-paid player.
See Perkins, supra, at F4; Al Stump, A Money Player, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1991, at Cl. In striking
contrast, Barry Bonds' current contract to play professional baseball for the San Francisco Giants
guarantees him $43,750,000 over six years. Marc Topkin, Bonds Cleans Up on Day of Big Deals, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 9, 1992, at IC. Moreover, one commentator has observed that "the average
factory worker in America, making $28,000 a year, would have to work about 50 years to match what
a baseball player gets a season." John Underwood, From Baseball and Apple Pie, to Greed and Sky
Boxes, N.Y. TtMES, Oct. 31, 1993, § 1, at 22 (also city a 1992 survey by Pearl Meyer & Partners
concluding that the base salaries of the CEO's of America's 100 largest companies were $54,000 less
than the average baseball player's earnings for a season of play). The average baseball player's salary
is now approximately $1,060,000. John Helyar, Inside Baseball: Owners Grapple with Revenue Sharing, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1994, at B1.
27. Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 20809 (1922).
28. See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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soundly rebuffed by the courts.29 As if in recognition of its error, the
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly declared its intent to mitigate
damage resulting from the FederalBaseball exemption by construing the
exemption's scope as narrowly as possible."0 However, the judiciary has
declined to correct what truly is a problem of its own creation, by deferring to the principle of stare decisis.3' As it has become the focus of
greater attention, baseball's antitrust exemption has been attacked by the
media 2 and scholars,3" ridiculed by jurists, 3 and even derogated by the

Supreme Court itself as a mistake and an "anomaly.""
To escape its stare decisis dilemma and remedy the problem, the Court

turned to Congress.

6

Beginning in 1953, in Toolson v. New York Yan-

kees,37

the Supreme Court has repeatedly called for Congress to resolve
the anomaly of the FederalBaseball exemption in the best interests of the

29. Sde infra notes 39, 115-19 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 86-89, 115-22, 144-46 and accompanying text.
31. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 279 (1972). The Flood Court acknowledged the imperfection
of the FederalBaseball exemption, by noting that
[i]f this ruling is unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical, it is sufficient to answer, aside from
the distinctions between the businesses, that were we considering the question of baseball
for the first time upon a clean state we would have no doubts. But FederalBaseball held
the business of baseball outside the scope of the [Sherman Antitrust] Act. No other business
claiming the coverage of those cases has such an adjudication .... T]herefore... the
orderly way to eliminate error or discrimination, if any there be, is by legislation and not
by court decision.
Id. (quoting Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 450-52 (1957)). But see Judge:
Antitrust Laws Apply to Ownership, GAINESVILE SUN, Aug. 5, 1993, at 2C [hereinafter Antitrust Laws
Apply]. Recently, a United States district court denied a motion to dismiss a suit that was brought
against the MLB, claiming that MLB "frustrated" efforts to purchase the San Francisco Giants. Id. The
court stated that baseball's antitrust exemption applies to players' contracts and not the sale of baseball
teams. Id. If ultimately an antitrust violation is found and the case is appealed to the Supreme Court,
baseball's antitrust exemption will be narrowed further and the courts will have come a step closer to
reversing FederalBaseball.
32. See, e.g., The Business of Baseball, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1992, at G2 (reporting that the
exemption should be eliminated because it "gives baseball a legal suit of armor and invitation to arrogance that no other pro league enjoys"); Larry Guest, Logic Has Little to Do with Baseball's Lords,
ORLANDO SENTINEL Trm., Nov. 11, 1992, at C1 (stating that the premise that baseball is more sport
than interstate commerce is obviously wrong today).
33. See JOHN C. WEiSTART & CYM H. LOWEL, TmE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.02, at 486 n.61, 488 &
nn.76-77, 489 & nn.78-81 (1979).
34. See, e.g., Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005
(2d Cir. 1970) ("We freely acknowledge our belief that FederalBaseball was not one of Mr. Justice
Holmes' happiest days, that the rationale of Toolson is extremely dubious and that, to use the Supreme
Court's own adjectives, the distinction between baseball and other professional sports is 'unrealistic,'
'inconsistent' and 'illogical"') (quoting Radovich, 352 U.S. at 452).
35. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
36. See infra notes 137-42, 149-50 and accompanying text.
37. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
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American people. 8 Congress has responded by attempting to limit the
scope of professional baseball's antitrust exemption. On numerous occasions, Congress has considered legislation that would extend the same free
market conditions to professional baseball that exist for other professional
sports.39 However, whenever Congress has considered repealing the exemption, MLB has managed to dissuade the legislators from eliminating
its special status.
Whatever the reasons for its past inaction, MLB's rejection of the
Lurie-Tampa Bay transaction demonstrates that Congress must repeal the
judicially created antitrust exemption for professional baseball. MLB owners have repeatedly engaged in a vast array of anticompetitive actions and
market-disoriented behavior through their freedom to impose collusive
restraints under the Federal Baseball exemption.' MLB owners use
closed-door meetings to decide whether and where baseball franchises may
relocate, 4 which would be a "conspiracy" in violation of federal antitrust
law in any other business.42 By interfering with free-market principles,
MLB also has repeatedly coerced municipalities into providing lucrative
inducements to attract or retain a baseball franchise. 3 These payoffs often include stadium facilities, tax incentives, and minimum guaranteed
ticket purchases-all extracted at above-market levels and paid for out of
public funds and the pockets of baseball fans." Such practices may ap-

38. See, e.g., Flood, 407 U.S. at 283-85; Radovich, 352 U.S. at 450-52; Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
39. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 33, § 5.02, at 481 n.17; cf. Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971) (excluding professional basketball from the Federal Baseball exemption); Radovich, 352 U.S. at 450-51 (excluding professional football from the Federal Baseball antitrust exemption); Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870, 876 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (confirming
that professional hockey is subject to antitrust laws).
40. See infra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
41. See Hal Bodley, "Open Door" on Giants Sale Further Complicates Game, USA TODAY,
Sept. 10, 1992, at 7C. available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Majpap file (describing Bud Selig's announcement that any San Francisco buy-out proposal for the Giants that matched the Tampa Bay offer
could bypass Mr. Lurie and be considered directly by the MLB executive committee); Mark Maske,
Game Sets Course Amid Chaos, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1992, at D3; Mark Maske, Owners Say Giants
to Remain in San Francisco,WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1992, at Fl.
42. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., State v. Milwaukee Braves, 144 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Wis.) (expressing concern that communities like Milwaukee be protected from arbitrary and unfair dealings of major league baseball),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966). The Tampa Bay area is the best example of a place exploited by
MLB owners to sweeten the pot of incentives required for a MLB city to keep its team. See supra
notes 6-10, 20 and accompanying text.
44. See generally Ron Berler, Bitter Battle Over the White Sox, L.A. TiMES, Aug. 8, 1986, § 3, at
3 (reporting $100 million in low-interest, tax-free bonds to build a new stadium for the Chicago White
Sox); Gayle Reaves, Sleeping Giant, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 7, 1993, at 6 (reporting the building of a new stadium for the Texas Rangers after the deal with the Tampa Bay investors fell through).
The practice of giving such inducements has been widely criticized. See Thomas DiBacco, Stop These
Gifts to Team Owners, USA TODAY, June 15, 1990, at 12A, available in LEXIS, Nexis library,
Majpap file; Howard Kurtz, Subsidizing Sports Czars: How We Paid to Help Colts Desert to India-
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pear to be good business for MLB in the short term; however, as ticket
prices escalate and local taxpayers balk at the unfair burdens they are
forced to shoulder, it is becoming clear that professional baseball is in
jeopardy of losing its hallowed status as America's national pastime.
Today's newspapers and media reports are filled with disquieting
stories about baseball. Market manipulations in the purchase and location
of franchise teams have led to an increasing amount of litigation against
MLB.45 Disputes over the broadcasting of baseball games to the American people have become commonplace.46 The owners' failure to fill the
vacancy resulting from their forced removal of Commissioner of Baseball
Fay Vincent has continued to draw fire from MLB critics.47 Bizarre and
embarrassing incidents that denigrate the sport's image, such as the censuring of team owner Marge Schott for the use of ethnic and racial epithets, have not helped the situation.48 Baseball clearly is in trouble.
The current chaotic state of professional baseball has deionstrated
that, rather than prospering under its unique exemption, the business of
professional baseball may soon face a collapse because of its own caprice.
To the extent that it honestly can still be called a "sport,"49 American
baseball is being strangled by the artificial constraints and arbitrary actions
of its owners.5 0 MLB owners, by operating like feudal barons outside the
boundaries of the federal antitrust laws, are in danger of destroying the
game of baseball.
This commentary will examine the historical, economic, and jurisprudential bases underlying MLB's antitrust exemption. Although MLB has
treated the Federal Baseball decision as a carte blanche,51 this analysis
will demonstrate that the judicially created exemption was only intended

napolis, WASH. PosT, Apr. 1, 1984, at C5.
45. See, e.g., Glen Macnaw, A Lawsuit That Could Change the Way Baseball Does Business,
PHILA. INQUIRER, June 27, 1993, at D1; Paul Tash, Court Fight Over Giants Might Be Inevitable, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 13, 1992, at IA; Marc Topkin, Two FormerTampa Bay Investors Sue Baseball, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 16, 1992, at 6C.
46. See, e.g., Keenan M. Conder, Contract Dispute Threatens Rangers Telecasts-Cable Firm,
Home Sports Entertainmentat Odds Over Inclusion in Basic Subscriptions, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Feb. 21, 1993, at 6M; Patrick Maio, Is Eli Down, Out in the 9th? Orioles Future Hangs on TV Pacts,
Labor Contracts, BALTIMORE BuS. J., Feb. 5, 1993, § 1, at 1; Richard Sandomir, Baseball: Made-ForTV Mystery: What, If Anything, Do Yanks Owe City?, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1993, § 8, at 6.
47. E.g., Tom Callahan, Baseball, Handled Without Care, WASH. POST, May 9, 1993, at D3;
Shirley Povich, Baseball CommissionerAppears to Be Another Endangered Species, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
7, 1993, at C9; Shirley Povich, Owners Guilty of an Error of Commission, WASH. POST, Jan. 25,

1993, at C2.
48. See, e.g., Claire Smith, On Baseball: Just Another Swing and a Miss, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,

1993, at B13.
49. See supra note 26.
50. See infra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
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to affect federal antitrust laws as they relate to the "reserve clause" system.52
Professional baseball's "reserve clause" system gives individual teams
the contractual right to control the terms of baseball players' employment
contracts, including control over when they play and the teams for whom
they play. 3 The contractual enforceability of baseball's reserve system
was first tested, and upheld, in 1890.14 Thirty-two years later, the United
States Supreme Court formally adopted this federal antitrust exemption in
Federal Baseball and has subsequently addressed the subject directly on
three occasions." In each instance, the Court has analyzed and defined
the exemption in the context of anti-competitive effects from baseball's
reserve clause system.56 MLB's reliance on the Federal Baseball exemption in other contexts, such as preventing the movement of teams to new
cities, is unwarranted and exceeds the scope of this singular immunity
from federal antitrust laws.
The Supreme Court has recognized FederalBaseball as a mistake and
an "anomaly" several times since it created the antitrust exemption in
1922."7 Nevertheless, the exemption remains alive and well.58 Despite
acknowledging its error, the Court's respect for the principle of stare decisis continues to prevent the Court from correcting its mistake.59 The
Court has repeatedly announced that the fate of the exemption is in the
hands of Congress, not the judiciary.'
Congress therefore has not only the authority, but the Supreme Court's

52. See infra notes 96-109 and accompanying text.
53. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 33, § 5.03, at 501-03, 505-06.
54. See Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1890). The Metropolitan
court characterized the reserve clause system by noting that
[t]he most important feature of the national agreement, unquestionably, is the provision
according to the club members the privilege of reserving a stated number of players. No
other club of any association under the agreement dare engage any player so reserved ....
By preserving intact the strength of the team from year to year, it places the business of
base-ball on a permanent basis, and thus offers security to the investment of capital. The
reserve rule itself is a usurpation of the player's rights; but it is, perhaps, made necessary
by the peculiar nature of the ball business, and the player is indirectly compensated by the
improved standing of the game. The reserve rule takes a manager by the throat, and compels him to keep his hands off his neighbor's enterprise.
Id. at 203 (quoting an unnamed contemporary publication by a prominent, but also unnamed, professional player); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 259 n.1 (1972) (reviewing the history and application of professional baseball's reserve clause system).
55. See infra notes 96-109 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 96-109 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
58. See supra notes 25, 40-45 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 31, 36-39 and accompanying text.
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open invitation to abolish baseball's antitrust exemption. Congress has
reviewed professional baseball's status on several occasions, but declined
to act after receiving assurances from MLB that the exemption was necessary for the sport's survival." However, recent events demonstrate that

baseball's status and survival are in jeopardy. 2 Financial and legal problems stemming from MLB's anticompetitive behavior have directly resulted from the federal antitrust exemption.' Because baseball truly is

America's "national pastime,"' it must not be allowed to continue down
the ruinous road of unchecked avarice and greed. Now more than ever
before, professional baseball needs the stability and revitalization that
come from sensible business practices grounded in the exercise of free-

market principles.
Legislation that will remove the shackles of the Federal Baseball

exemption is the only cure for many of baseball's current problems.65
Elimination of baseball's singular exemption would restore harmony to the
federal antitrust structure and balance to the marketplace of professional
sports. The successful operation of other professional sports that have
flourished without the "benefit" of an antitrust exemption shows that

elimination of the exemption would not impose an undue burden on professional baseball. In fact, the only burden resulting from repeal of the
Federal Baseball exemption will rest with the MLB owners, who would
be required to clean up their act and return baseball to the principles and

practices of a fair and open marketplace. The time has come for Congress
to return the game to the American people by repealing baseball's judicial-

ly misbegotten antitrust exemption.67

61. See supra text accompanying note 39.
62. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text; infra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text; infra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
64. Flood, 407 U.S. at 264. As one court observed, "[a] tonic; an exercise, a safety-value, baseball is second only to Death as a leveler. So long as it remains our national game, America will abide
no monarchy, and anarchy will be too slow." Selig v. United States, 740 F.2d 572, 574 n.7 (7th Cir.
1984) (quoting Allen Sangree).
65. Legislation seeking to reduce or eliminate the exemption currently is pending in both chambers of the United States Congress. H.R. 10B was introduced in January of 1993 by Rep. Michael
Bilirakis (R-Fla.); S500 was introduced in March of 1993 by Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio).
66. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
67. Towards that end, several senators and representatives announced on April 29, 1993, the
formation of a coalition to eliminate professional baseball's antitrust exemption. Karl Vick, Fan
Groups Join Opposition to Antitrust Exemption, ST. PETRSBURG TDIES, Apr. 30, 1993, at 5C. Groups
that initially formed the coalition include: Major League Baseball Players' Association; Consumer
Federation of America; Capitol Baseball, Inc.; Tigers' Stadium Fan Club; D.C. Area Baseball Fans;
National Sports Fans Association; and Sports Fans United. See id. Founding congressional members of
the coalition include: Senators Bob Graham (D-Fla.) and Connie Mack (R-Fla.). and Representatives
Mike Synar (D-Okla.) and C.W. Young (R-1ll.). See id.
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HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

Organized baseball can trace its roots back almost one hundred and
forty years.68 Professional baseball goes back almost as far; the National
Association of Professional Baseball Players was formed in 1871,' and
the National League was created in 1876.70
Judicial cognizance of professional baseball, however, blossomed in
the Twentieth Century. In 1914 a New York state trial court ruled that
"organized baseball" was neither "interstate commerce" nor "trade" within
the meaning of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 7' In that case, American
League Baseball Club v. Chase,72 the trial court reasoned that antitrust
laws were inapplicable because the baseball franchise owners dealt with
players for their services and did not treat them as commodities or articles
of merchandise.73
Approximately seven years later, however, the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia, in National League of Professional Baseball Clubs
v. Federal Baseball Club,74 took a contrary position, holding that organized baseball violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by forcing the dissolution of the competing Federal League. The owners of the Baltimorebased franchise of the recently folded Federal League had sued the National League and its executives, alleging that the defendants used and
intentionally abused their perpetual option reserve clause to keep good
baseball players out of the Federal League, forcing the competitor's eventual demise.76 The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia's decision
68. See generally Flood, 407 U.S. at 260-62 (stating briefly the history of organized baseball).
Some authorities suggest that the game of baseball actually can trace its roots back almost 4000 years.
See Selig, 740 F.2d at 573 n.2 (citing ROBERT W. HENDERSON, BALL, BAT AND BISHOP 19-20
(1947)).
69. Flood, 407 U.S. at 261. In the first recorded professional game, the Kekiongas franchise of
Fort Wayne defeated Forest City of Cleveland, 2 to 0. Selig, 740 F.2d at 573. Franchises at the time
cost $10. Id.
70. Flood,407 U.S. at 261. The National League's distaste for competition existed from the start,
with at least one jurist observing: "The birth of the National League in 1876 spelled the end of the
National Association." Selig, 740 F.2d at 573.
71. American League Baseball Club v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 16-17 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
72. 149 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
73. Id. at 16-17.
74. 269 F. 681 (D.C. Cir. 1921), affd, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
75. See id. at 681, 687-88.
76. Id. at 682-83, 686-88. The FederalBaseball litigation actually began in 1915, when the owners of the Chicago franchise of the Federal League sued the National League for antitrust violations
that allegedly denied the plaintiff access to the professional baseball player market. Michael W. Klein,
Commentary, Rose Is in Red, Black Sox Are Blue: A Comparison of Rose v. Giamatti and the 1921
Black Sox Trial, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 551, 558 (1991). The case never went to trial,
however, because the presiding judge-Kenesaw Mountain Landis-withheld judgment to force a
settlement between the parties. See LEE LOWENFISH & TONY LUPIEN, THE IMPERFECT DIAMOND 89-90
(1980). A settlement was reached by the end of the year; in return for dropping the case, the Federal
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in National League seriously threatened baseball's status;" the trial court
had instructed the jury that the National League defendants were engaged
in interstate commerce,78 and the jury found that they had destroyed the
Federal League in order to perfect their monopoly of the sport.79 The trial
court awarded the Baltimore owners of the defunct Federal League team
treble damages of $240,000.80
The defendants succeeded in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia."' The appellate court overturned the lower court's decision in

April of 1921, holding that the business of professional baseball did not
violate the Sherman Act because "baseball is not [interstate] commerce,

though some of its incidents may be."82
The following year, in the case that is now universally recognized as
the progenitor of professional baseball's federal antitrust exemption, the
United States Supreme Court upheld the D.C. appellate court's decision,
ruling that baseball was outside the stream of commerce. In Federal
Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,' Jus-

tice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote for a unanimous United States Supreme
Court that: "The business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are
purely state affairs ....[P]ersonal effort, not related to production, is not
a subject of commerce."'
Since its 1922 decision in Federal Baseball, the Supreme Court has
limited the federal antitrust exemption solely to professional baseball.86
Justice Holmes' conclusions to the contrary, the Court quickly realized
that public exhibitions, whether sporting or theatrical, constituted "com-

League team owners collectively received $600,000 and the right to sell their players to any franchise
in the National League, while the owners of the St. Louis and Chicago Federal League franchises in
particular were permitted to purchase their National League counterparts (then the St. Louis Browns
and the Chicago Cubs, respectively). Klein, supra at 558. The owners of all the Federal League
franchises, except for the Baltimore Terrapins team, agreed to the settlement. Id. The Baltimore owners
were so intent on keeping professional baseball, however, that they rejected the settlement and proceeded to court by initiating their own litigation. See id. at 558-59.
77. Klein, supra note 76, at 559. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia was the
forerunner of the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia. Id.
78. National League, 269 F. at 684.
79. See id. at 682, 684.
80. Id. at 682.
81. Klein, supra note 76, at 559-60.
82. National League, 269 F. at 685.
83. Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09
(1922).
84. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
85. Id. at 208-09.
86. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451 (1957); United States v.
International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 242 (1955); United States v. Schubert, 348 U.S. 222, 227-28
(1955); Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
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merce." 7 Although the Court has recognized that professional baseball's
singular immunity from the federal antitrust laws is "an exception and an
anomaly,""8 the exemption continues to be recognized as an extant product of judicial stare decisis8 9
III. THE SCOPE OF BASEBALL'S EXEMPTION
A great deal has been written and said concerning the scope of professional baseball's unique exemption to the federal antitrust laws." For
obvious reasons, the MLB owners and their allied interests have argued
consistently and repeatedly that the exemption is comprehensive, covering
all facets of the "business of baseball."9 ' Some lower courts have blithely
agreed,92 others have not,93 and still others have declined to address the
issue.' Even today, courts differ over the scope and application of the
Federal Baseball exemption.95
The United States Supreme Court, which created the exemption in
Federal Baseball,96 has specifically addressed the issue on two subsequent occasions: in 1953 in Toolson v. New York Yankees97 and in 1972
in Flood v. Kuhn.9" A careful review of these decisions reveals that the
exemption created by the Supreme Court should be limited solely to the
federal antitrust laws as they apply to professional baseball's reserve
clause.
The basis for this conclusion is twofold. First, whenever the United
States Supreme Court has directly addressed the issue of professional
baseball's federal antitrust exemption, it has done so in the context of

87. E.g., Shubert, 348 U.S. at 226-27.
88. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
89. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 & n.5 (1992). But see Antitrust Laws
Apply, supra note 31.
90. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 33, § 5.02, at 480 & n.17.
91. See, e.g., Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs. 799 F. Supp. 1475,
1489 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
92. E.g., Portland Baseball Club v. Kuhn, 491 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1974).
93. E.g., Postema, 799 F. Supp. at 1489; Henderson Broadcasting Co. v. Houston Sports Ass'n.
541 F. Supp. 263, 265-71 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
94. Twin City Sportservice v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 365 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (ignoring issue of baseball's exemption in connection with antitrust lawsuit against team over cancellation
of stadium concessionaire's contract), rev'd on other grounds, 512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1975).
95. Compare Piazza v. Major League Baseball, No. 92-7173, slip op. at 52-54 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4,
1993) (holding that the Federal Baseball antitrust exemption may not apply to a transfer of ownership
interests, depending upon the factual record) with Morisani v. Major League Baseball, No. 92-9631,
slip op. at 11-12 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Aug. 26, 1993) (holding that the FederalBaseball antitrust exemption does apply to decisions concerning ownership of baseball franchises).
96. See supra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.

97. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
98. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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dealing specifically with the anticompetitive effects of baseball's reserve
clause. 9 Admittedly, commentators and some lower courts have attributed a broader scope to the exemption." Nevertheless, being a creature of judicial fiat,'01 the exemption's origins and development are
readily discernable. Strictly speaking, baseball's unique privilege was created, and should be defined, by three United States Supreme Court cases:
Federal Baseball,10 2 Toolson, ' 3 and Flood."4 Established
jurisprudence dictates that the scope of baseball's antitrust exemption must
be construed solely by these three cases.
While Justice Holmes' opinion in Federal Baseball" , made no specific mention of "the reserve clause"'" on its face, the appellate decision
from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia devoted substantial
attention to the National League's reserve clause and its significant impact
on the movement and transfer of ballplayers to the competing Federal,
League.' Indeed, the appellate court associated the reserve clause directly with the anticompetitive behavior that ultimately had sunk the Federal League"° and which resulted in the lower court's judgment against
the defendants for violation of the Sherman Act:
The reserve clause and the publication of the ineligible lists, together with other restrictive provisions, had the effect of deterring
players from violating their contracts, and hence the Federal
League and its constituent clubs, of which the appellee was one,
were unable to obtain players who had contracts with the appellants . . .o
FederalBaseball's progeny, Toolson and Flood, also resolved judicial
disputes arising from baseball's reserve clause."' In Toolson, the plain99. FederalBaseball, 259 U.S. at 207-09 (focusing discussion on whether organized baseball was
interstate commerce without specifically mentioning the reserve clause as did the lower courts);
Toolson, 346 U.S. at 356-57; Flood, 407 U.S. at 264-66; see also supra note 54 and accompanying
text (explaining the reserve clause system used in players' contracts).
100. See, e.g., Postema, 799 F. Supp. at 1489.
101. See supra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
102. 259 U.S. at 200; see supra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
103. 346 U.S. at 356.

104. 407 U.S. at 258.
105. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 260-70 (1975).
106. FederalBaseball,259 U.S. at 207-09.
107. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (explaining the reserve clause system used in
players' contracts).
108. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, 269
F. 681, 684, 686-88 (1921).

109. Id.
110. Id. at 687.
111. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (explaining the reserve clause system used in
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tiff claimed that his contract with the New York Yankees effectively denied him of his means of livelihood as a result of his having been placed
on the ineligibility list."2 In Flood, the plaintiff claimed that the reserve
clause allowed the St. Louis Cardinals to trade him to the Philadelphia
Phillies without cause, consent or even consultation." 3 Thus, all of the
Supreme Court's decisions regarding baseball's exemption from federal
antitrust laws have been decided in the context of the reserve clause." 4
This fact is significant when taken in context with a second key consideration-exceptions such as that created by Federal Baseball are to be narrowly construed.
The policy of narrow construction for exemptions is well established
in antitrust law." 5 The Supreme Court applied this principle in Radovich
v. National Football League, denying football the exemption." 6 In other
cases, the Federal Baseball exemption has also been narrowly tailored to
exclude basketball,' 7 boxing," 8 and even theatrical presentations. "9
Likewise, Justice Blackmun's decision in Flood repeatedly addressed the
Federal Baseball exemption within the narrow context of the reserve
clause.'
Having created the exemption, the United States Supreme Court is the
ultimate arbiter of its scope. Several other courts, however, have also
construed the Federal Baseball exemption narrowly.'
Likewise,
policymakers and enforcers in the executive branch who have dealt with
this issue have also concluded as a matter of general policy that the Federal Baseball exemption is to be narrowly construed.' 2
players' contracts).
112. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 362-63 (Burton, J., dissenting) (setting forth selected allegations of
the plaintiff's complaint).
113. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 265.
114. See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
115. See United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967); California v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962); WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 33, § 5.02, at 499 &
n.147.
116. 352 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1957).
117. Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205-06 (1971).
118. United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 240-42 (1955).
119. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1955) (holding that "legitimate theater"
bookings were likewise excluded from the exemption); Hart v. B.F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262
U.S. 271, 273-74 (1923) (holding that vaudeville booking was fair game for enforcement of the antitrust laws).
120. Flood, 407 U.S. at 259, 275, 287.
121. E.g., Piazza v. Major League Baseball, No. 92-7173, slip op. at 52-54 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4,
1993); Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1489 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (holding that professional baseball's federal antitrust exemption does not protect against female
umpire's common law restraint of trade allegations of employment discrimination); Henderson Broadcasting Co. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 265-71 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that antitrust
exemption does not protect agreement between professional baseball team and radio station to restrain
trade in baseball broadcasting market).
122. See, e.g., Letter from Kenneth P. Bergquist, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Senator Strom
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With both the judiciary and the executive branches having spoken on
the exemption's narrow scope, the question remains how to narrow the
exemption to reserve clause situations only. Past and current events evidence the need for corrective action."a3 There is no doubt, for example,
that communities like Tampa Bay, as well as individual team owners like
Mr. Lurie, may continue to be victimized by MLB's conspiratorial actions. 24 Moreover, recent events involving the San Francisco Giants are
only the latest example in a long line of such abuses."2 Nevertheless,
even though the United States Supreme Court created its "aberration" back
in 1922,"2 judicial decisions of the ensuing years make it clear that the
solution will not come from the courts."

IV. THE IMPACT OF STARE DECISIS
In various opinions, the United States Supreme Court has expressed
the concern that, after the FederalBaseball decision, the business of baseball had been allowed to develop with the expectation that it enjoyed
federal antitrust immunity and that a later decision to overturn the exemption would retroactively undermine this reliance interest.' For example,
in explaining the Toolson decision in his opinion in Radovich, Justice
Clark noted that "vast efforts had gone into the development and organization of baseball since that decision [FederalBaseball] and enormous capital had been invested in reliance on its permainence."' 29 Presumably,
these investments were made on the MLB owners' reliance that the basic
structure and operation of the leagues could, and would, remain undisturbed by the federal antitrust laws.
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions tend to confirm the
notion that stare decisis will prevent the Court from correcting its own
error.3 In Payne v. Tennessee,' Chief Justice Rehnquist noted for the
majority that the principle of stare decisis was especially strong in cases
involving property rights and interests: "Considerations in favor of stare
decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights,
Thurmond, Senate Committee on the Judiciary 8 (Mar. 13, 1986) (on file with the Florida Law Review) (endorsing policy of construing professional baseball's federal antitrust exemption narrowly).
123. See supra notes 1-19, 41-48 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 1-19 and accompanying text; see also Underwood, supra note 26, at 22
(commenting on New York Yankees' owner George Steinbrenner's use of relocation threats to obtain
municipal concessions, and New York Mets' demands for city and state funds to build a new domed
stadium in Willets Point).
125. See supra notes 1-19 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
128. See Radovich, 352 U.S. at 450.
129. Id.
130. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2610 (1991).
131. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
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where reliance interests are involved ....
Presumably, these are the same kinds of property rights and interests
that convinced Justice Blackmun and a majority of the United States Supreme Court in 1972 to uphold professional baseball's antitrust exemption
in Flood.3 3 Whether reasonable or not, it is unlikely the judiciary will
undo that which it has done.1 34 As recently as the 1992 term, the 35Supreme Court cited to its decision in the Flood case as valid authoity.
Given that the judiciary is unlikely to disturb professional baseball's
federal antitrust exemption,"' it is Congress' responsibility to assess the
37
situation and determine whether the exemption should be eliminated.'
A variety of reasons, both local and national
in scope, now warrant revo38
cation of baseball's privileged status.
V. THE BENEFITS OF UNIFORM ANTITRUST REGULATION
Congress has jurisdiction to investigate and legislate on the subject of
professional baseball. 39 Congressional action is warranted because there
are several local interests that are unfairly ignored or defeated as a result
of baseball's antitrust exemption. For example, a community understandably has a material interest in preventing the loss of its sports franchise
because the local community receives numerous benefits. 4 Similarly,
the franchise may have both a direct connection with the local govern-

132. Id. at 2610.

133. 407 U.S. at 258.
134. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. But see Antitrust Laws Apply, supra note 31.
135. See Ankenbradt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (1992) (upholding judicial precedent
despite absence of jurisdictional authority, where affirmative congressional inaction and principle of
stare decisis support continued adherence to existing case law).
136. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. But see Antitrust Laws Apply, supra note 31.
137. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 284 ("If there is any inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency and illogic of long standing that is to be remedied by the Congress and not by this Court.");
see also Letter from Carla Stem, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Bill French (Oct. 16, 1992) (on file with the
Florida Law Review) (expressing the Bush administration's belief that Congress has the responsibility
to make changes to professional baseball's antitrust exemption).
138. See supra notes 1-19, 45-48 and accompanying text.
139. H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) ("After full review of all the foregoing facts
and with due consideration of modem judicial interpretation of the scope of the commerce clause, it is
the studied judgment of the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power that the Congress has
jurisdiction to investigate and legislate on the subject of professional baseball."); see also supra note
137 and accompanying text (explaining that both the judicial and executive branches of federal goverment acknowledge that any change to baseball's antitrust exemption should be effected through the
U.S. Congress).
140. See Benjamin A. Okner, Subsidies of Stadiums and Arenas, in GOVERNMENT AND THE
SPORTS BUSINESS 325, 327-30 (Roger G. Noll. ed., 1974). Local governments often subsidize professional sports by charging stadium rents below fair market value and exempting professional teams
from local property taxes. Id. at 325. In return. however, the local community receives benefits including enhancement of the city's image; increased local employment, revenues, and tax collections from
the economic impact of the team; and additional entertainment for local residents. Id. at 328.
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ment, in the form of stadium leases, financing commitments and the like,
as well as a significant effect on the local economy. 4 ' Because the degee of governmental and private involvement is likely to vary from case
to case, effective regulation is best achieved if the Federal Baseball ex-

emption is repealed and professional baseball is required to conform with
both federal and state antitrust laws.'42
In addition to local considerations, baseball's antitrust exemption
should be revoked for national concerns as well. 43 The United States
Supreme Court has already labeled the Federal Baseball antitrust exemption an "aberration"'" and has made it clear that other sports may not
partake of such immunity.' 45 Indeed, in Radovich, the Court was emphatic that it would "adhere to-but not extend" the anomaly created by Federal Baseball and confirmed by Toolson.'"
The FederalBaseball exemption stands in stark contrast to an otherwise pervasive application of the antitrust laws to insure a competitive

environment in all industries where a free market economy, rather than
government regulation, has been chosen to allocate resources and match

supply with demand.

7

The time has come for Congress to repeal this

exception because of the larger federal policy of promoting free commerce.' 41 Indeed, support for action by Congress can be found in other
United States Supreme Court cases not involving athletics. 49 In order to
141. See Comment, The Superbowl and the Sherman Act: ProfessionalTeam Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 81 HARV. L. REv. 418, 418 & n.4 (1967); supra note 140 (explaining that local governments often subsidize sports franchises and the local community receivesbenefits in return).
142. Recent events involving the San Francisco Giants and the Seattle Mariners baseball franchises
demonstrate that states and municipalities desire a level playing field and a fair forum in which to seek
enforcement of their property rights and interests. In addition to current events, history has developed
a record of such lawsuits already having been thieatened or filed in the context of baseball and other
professional sports. Among the more notable examples of such litigation is the dispute involving the
sale and relocation of the Milwaukee baseball franchise. See State v. Milwaukee Braves, 144 N.W.2d
I (Wis.). cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966).
143. See supra notes 1-19, 45-48 and accompanying text.
144. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
145. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
146. Radovich, 352 U.S. at 451.
147. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 287 & n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting). As Justice Douglas noted in his
dissent to Flood, had the owners of baseball undertaken any of their predatory practices in a field or
industry other than baseball, the courts would have had no trouble sustaining the plaintiff's claims. Id.;
see also WEISTART & LOWELL,supra note 33, at 480 & n.17 (citing authority showing the scope of
baseball's antitrust exemption).
148. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Boys Mkt.
v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); WEISTART & LOWELL,supra note 33, at 499 & n.147.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Topeo Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972), wherein the Supreme
Court observed:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free
enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms ....Implicit in such freedom is the notion that it cannot be foreclosed with respect
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preserve the general objectives of the antitrust laws and to promote free
competition in open markets, the Supreme Court has repeatedly taken the
150
position that "immunity from antitrust laws 'isnot lightly implied.""
At the very least, where an immunity does exist, it should be construed
narrowly.'
The federal antitrust laws are neither punitive nor unduly burdensome
in their nature. Their purpose is to promote free and open commerce by
prohibiting anticompetitive behavior. 152 The very fact that other professional sports have developed and even thrived within these laws is proof
enough that loss of the Federal Baseball exemption would not precipitate
a crisis for baseball. 53 To the contrary, in light of current events,' 54 revocation of the federal antitrust exemption may be the sport's best hope
for avoiding a crisis.
VI. BASEBALL'S TROUBLED TIMES
Recent controversies involving professional baseball demonstrate the
need for uniform application of the federal antitrust laws across all professional sports.'55 Several notable events reflect the degree to which market abuses may arise absent decision making that is dictated by the unrestricted
forces of supply and demand operating in a free-market econo56
my. 1
The most recent and obvious example of market manipulation involves
efforts by Tampa Bay-based investors to purchase the San Francisco Giants baseball franchise from its current owner, Robert Lurie.' The Tampa Bay investors and Mr. Lurie reached agreement for the sale and relocation of the franchise.'58 However, outside elements from San Francisco,
as well as MLB insiders, combined forces to frustrate
what otherwise
59
transaction.
market
fair
simple,
a
been
have
would

to one sector of the economy because certain private citizens or groups believe that such
foreclosure might promote greater competition in a more important sector of the economy.
Id.
150. United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967) (quoting California v. Federal Power Comm., 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962).
151. Letter from Kenneth P. Bergquist, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Senator Strom Thurmond, Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 122, at 8.
152. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text (explaining that the exemption does not apply
to football, basketball, or boxing).
154. See supra notes 1-19, 45-48 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 1-19, 45-48 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 1-19 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 1-19 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 1-19 and accompanying text.
159. See Piazza v. Major League Baseball, No. 92-7173, slip op. at 4-5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1993);
Tim Keown, Lurie Hoping Decision Is Forthcoming, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 28, 1992, at C2; Thomas C.
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This same behavior has occurred on repeated occasions in the past,
when MLB's principals have exploited professional baseball's federal
antitrust exemption to frustrate market-driven transactions."'6 In many
instances, for example, baseball franchise owners have brandished the
antitrust exemption to effectively extort tax benefits, new stadium construction, and other benefits from state and local authorities. 6' Moreover,
the inevitable litigation and negative publicity resulting from such behavior tarnishes the century-old image of baseball as America's national pastime, creating instead a tawdry picture of oligarchical greed and
domination.'
Ultimately, such behavior is counterproductive to the
sport itself, to the communities in which it is played, and to the American

people."
Last season's controversy over the Commissioner of Baseball, ultimately resulting in Faye Vincent's resignation, also provides evidence that
the time for revocation of the federal antitrust exemption has come.'" To

a large degree, Congress has refrained from disturbing baseball's exemption on the understanding that the sport's internal structure was sufficiently
sound to assure reasonable and competent self-governance. 65 The MLB

owners' 1992 coup d'etat against the Commissioner of Baseball has left a
significant void within the sport's governing structure."' Moreover, the
manner in which Mr. Vincent was forced to resign casts doubt on the
notion that MLB is capable of governing itself in a fair and prudent fashion.

Toblin, Shin Yet to Make His Move, ST. PETERSBURG TMEs. Sept. 29, 1992, at Cl.
160. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
161. See Complaint for Specific Performance. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 4-5, San Francisco v. San Francisco Giants, et al., No. 945684 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sept. 4, 1992) (alleging that the owners of the San Francisco Giants exploited their control over the baseball franchise to obtain tax concessions, elimination of potentially competitive sports events, and stadium improvements from the municipal government of the host community); see also supra note 124 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text; see also Radovich, 352 U.S. at 454 (stating
that antitrust laws "protect the victims of the forbidden practices as well as the public").
164. See Murray Chass, Vincent, Bowing to Owners' Will, Resigns as Baseball Commissioner,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1992, at At; Joe Henderson, Vincent Quits Baseball, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Sept. 8,
1992, at Al, A5.
165. See Eric Brazil, Take Me Out to the Monopoly, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 9, 1992, at DI (reviewing ANDREW S. ZIBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS (1992)).
166. See generally Matthew B. Pachman, Note, Limits on the DiscretionaryPowers of Professional Sports Commissioners:A Historicaland Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete Rose Controversy, 76 VA. L. REv. 1409 (1990) (discussing the powers of professional sports commissioners).
167. See Ira Berkow, Welcome to the Major Leagues, Bud Selig Presiding,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
1992, § 8, at 1.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Despite its current problems, 6 ' the sport of baseball continues to
hold a special place in the hearts of Americans everywhere. Ironically, it
is that special status as "America's national pastime" that requires Congress to take action."'
Professional baseball has exploited and abused its unique antitrust
exception to the point where a crisis may be imminent. The Commissioner
was inartfully deposed, 7 ' the owners remain embroiled in realignment
and franchise relocation disputes,'
and the prospects for a serious
players' strike or owners' lockout loom closer with each passing day.
The time has come for baseball to join its sister sports in doing business on a fair and level playing field.' Compliance with federal antitrust laws will require responsibility, stability, and propriety from professional baseball. Given the current state of the sport, however, such "burdens" should be welcomed for the benefits they ultimately will bring for
all concerned, especially the American people. To assure these benefits,
Congress must act to legislatively revoke the judicially-created Federal
Baseball antitrust exemption.'7 3

168. See supra notes 1-19, 45-48 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 1-19 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
173. A bill to revoke the judicially-created Federal Baseball antitrust exemption was introduced
by U.S. Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Oh.) during the First Session of the 103d Congress, on
March 3, 1993. The text of the Senate Bill is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Professional Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1993."
SEC.2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that(1) the business of organized professional baseball is in, or affects, interstate
commerce; and
(2) the antitrust laws should be amended to reverse the result of the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States in Federal Baseball Club v. National
League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S.C. 356
(1953), and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), which exempted baseball from
coverage under the antitrust laws.
SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following
new section:
"SEC. 27. Except as provided in Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. 291 et seq.) (commonly
known as the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961), the antitrust laws shall apply to the business of organized professional baseball."
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The provisions and amendments made by this Act shall take effect one year after the
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date of the enactment of this Act and(1) shall apply io conduct that occurs and any agreement in effect after such effective date; and
(2) shall not apply to conduct that occurred before such effective date.
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